3 case -Belgium -the long-term stock market performance remains positive (2.5 per cent yearly real return over the 20 th century), and superior to that of other investments.
In this paper, we claim that a more detailed look at the methodology used in constructing stock market indices is required before any valid international comparison. Concentrating on the French case, we show that formerly accepted indices built on particular sets of assumptions can seriously mislead empirical finance research. If the theory and practice of indices has long been mastered by economists and statistical institutions (a 1922 book by Irving Fisher being still a major reference 6 ), stock market indices have been built in many countries up until recently with different objectives than the measure of the return for the investor 7 . The Cowles commission in the 1930s was a pioneer in using indices in order to measure stock market performance from the point of view of an investor 8 . In spite of this, even the Standard & Poor's index suffers serious flaws 9 . In France, the only early attempt to build indices in that same perspective, that of the newspaper Agefi in the 1930s, was short lived.
In this paper, we propose a new stock index for the French stock market from 1854 to 1998, the first one built in order to measure variations in French stock prices from the point of view of the investor.
We first describe the index's methodology, which is based on Euronext's CAC-40, adapting it slightly to take into account some constraints from historical research. Basically, the index is a monthly index of the 40 most prominent shares among French firms, ranked by market capitalization. Since the selection is adapted every year, we avoid survivor bias. Our index is weighted by these capitalizations and its composition and weights are adjusted yearly. These characteristics, which are standard for 6 I. Fisher, The Making of Index Numbers. A Study of their Varieties, Tests, and Reliability (New York, 1922 ). today's indices, were frequently not present in older indices, which may explain a significant difference in their outcomes.
The first major result of this article is to provide new estimates of the long term returns that holders of such a portfolio of French stocks obtained. We show that the price index (without dividends) didn't protect its owners against inflation. Its real performance was positive up until 1914 (in a period of stable prices) but it was substantially negative for the 20 th century in spite of the rapid growth of stock prices since the 1980s.
When one turns to total return (including the dividend yield, supposedly tax-exempted), the performance is substantial from 1854 to1914 (more than 5 per cent yearly total return net of inflation), but very low for the 20 th century as a whole. Since 1914, gold has proved to be a better investment than stocks.
These results contrast strongly with those of Arbulu and Gallais-Hamonno, who link the official 20 th century indices to similarly constructed new indices for the 19 th century and form the basis for French investment performance in the Dimson-Marsh-Staunton synthesis 10 . We show that the reason for the divergence rests on the methodology adopted by Arbulu and the official indices, which suffer both survivor bias and weighting problems. In particular, they don't weigh the stocks by capitalization, consequently giving much higher implicit weights to small caps, leading to a seriously overvalued index in the long run.
Contrasting with the well-known results for the US, the low equity premium that we observe in France is in line with most models of risk aversion 11 . We then suggest that if our revisionist approach of French indices can be extended to other European markets, the equity premium puzzle may disappear 10 P. Arbulu, Le marché parisien des actions au XIXème siècle : performance et efficience d 'un marché émergent, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (University of Orléans, 1998) ; G. Gallais-Hamonno and P. Arbulu.
"La rentabilité réelle des actifs boursiers de 1950 à 1992 ", Economie et Statistique, no. 281 (1995 For the US, see for example R.R. Ibbotson and R. A. Sinquefield. "Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation:
Simulations of the Future 1976 -2000 ", Journal of Business, 49, no. 3 (1976 , pp. 11-47; or J. Siegel, "The Equity Premium: Stock and Bond Returns since 1802", Financial Analysts Journal, 48; no.1 (1992) , pp. 28-38. 5 in many of the cases discussed for example by Barro, and end up (as some earlier studies already argued) as a mostly US phenomenon 12 .
Finally, we argue that the evolution of the CAC-40 in the twentieth century can be understood as the result of the wars and the inflationary periods, suggesting that the impact of major wars on private wealth has been underestimated up until now. The first section presents in detail the methodology of our index. Differences between earlier indices and ours are discussed and some robustness checks made in the next one. We then present the main results and the main changes in policy regimes that may explain the index performance in the long run, and conclude. 12 R.J. Barro, "Rare Disasters and Assets Markets in the Twentieth Century", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, no. 3 (2006) , pp. 823-66.
I METHODOLOGY: A WEIGHTED BLUE CHIPS INDEX ALONG THE LINES OF THE CAC40
The aim of this section is to detail the methodology we used to build the new index. In the very long run, even details matter, since any error is magnified by the effect of compounded interest. The index concentrates on stocks of French firms; not because French investors held only French stocks (they actually held many foreign ones, especially up until World War One 13 ), but because focusing on national securities is the first step generally used before considering the effects of international diversification, which could be measured using various foreign indices.
The procedure we use can be summarized as follows. The prices, dividends and number of shares are collected for all French stocks listed on the Paris official stock exchange for the first Friday of each year. Capitalizations are calculated for that date. We then take the 40 highest capitalizations for inclusion in the index for the following year, with two exceptions: when various securities of the same firm are listed, we only consider the one with the highest capitalization; we also exclude firms with less than 10.000 shares. For the 40 firms in the index, we gather monthly prices and calculate the market index by weighting these prices with market capitalizations, in order to make it reflect the actual market) 14 .
We chose to build a blue chips index because the most important shares it includes are precisely those held by most investors 15 . Small firms were usually heavily dominated by family owners as in most continental Europe 16 ; their shares were sometimes listed in spite of being closely held because no constraint on minimum free float existed. This led these stocks to be illiquid, which was a major 13 Ch.-A. Michalet, Les placements des épargnants français de 1815 à nos jours (Paris, 1968 7 concern for ordinary investors (and led financial advisors to recommend avoiding them 17 ). Family control could also lead to agency problems and price manipulation, also threatening ordinary investors. Furthermore, both low liquidity and price deviations are also a problem for the building of an index and its interpretation 18 . So the restriction to blue chips should help our index to represent the behaviour of investors better 19 and to avoid including significant liquidity or risk premia, so that the long term decline in returns could not be misinterpreted 20 . These reasons explain the dominance of blue chips indices in financial analysis today.
Our index concentrates on French firms, which are defined by their legal status, not by the place they have their activity: the Suez and the first Panama canals are French firms. So are French subsidiaries of foreign firms such as Thomson-Houston. We consider for inclusion firms listed on all French exchanges. In practice, almost all blue chips listed on the official Paris Bourse, but there were a few exceptions, such as some Northern France coal mines that listed in Lille up to the early 1920s.
Diversification is usually considered as sufficient to eliminate specific risk when the number of stocks in a portfolio reaches thirty 21 . For an index weighted by stock market capitalizations, a somewhat higher number is better. We chose forty stocks in order to satisfy these requirements and to facilitate the linkage with today's CAC 40, the major Euronext-Paris index. It might be argued that the number of stocks included should increase with time and the development of the stock market. Actually, the Paris stock exchange was well developed (in terms for example of market capitalization to GDP) quite 17 early, and suffered a decline during the 20 th century from which it recovered only in the last 30 years 22 : as shown in Table 1 , the proportion of our 40 firms in total market capitalization varied a lot, and with only a weak declining trend. It has also always been very high. These reasons -and the search for simplicity -led us to hold constant the number of firms in our index.
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
The list of the stocks included in the index is fixed following a stable, simple and transparent formula in order to avoid ex-post insight. This requires us to avoid today's practice of choosing the stocks composing the CAC-40 among the 100 biggest capitalizations listed in Euronext-Paris, with the help of a scientific committee that we cannot reinvent for previous periods. We therefore include more simply the 40 stocks with the biggest capitalizations, and we rebalance the portfolio each year at the beginning of the year. The yearly rebalancing of the portfolio allows us to eliminate the survivor bias that affects many retrospective studies of stock prices. This is all the more important since a number of major firms failed during the period under study, and should not be excluded 23 .
We added two minor criteria to the capitalization for the selection of stocks included in the index. The first one is a liquidity criterion: we decided to exclude from the index all firms with less than 10,000
shares. The reasons for this choice can be traced to the functioning of the 19 th Paris Bourse, which sometimes listed stocks without wondering about the potential for an active market 24 . This was the case for some firms with a very small number of shares, especially insurance companies whose statutes frequently even required the agreement of their Board for any stock transaction to be valid. We chose a low number, as 10,000 corresponds to one fourth of the average number of shares of all the firms listed on the market in 1853, the last year for which the number of firms satisfying the requirements for inclusion in the index is below 40 (the reason we start the index in 1854). In any case, that liquidity constraint only excludes a small number of firms and only during a short period, so that it cannot significantly affect the long term performance of the index 25 .
Our last criterion is the limitation to one category of stock per firm for inclusion in the index. Firms frequently had various categories of shares, especially in the 19 th century: preference shares were less widespread than in the U.S., but the relationship between ordinary and other shares was sometime similar to that between ordinary and preference shares in the US. For example, actions de jouissance (enjoyment shares) were shares whose nominal value had been reimbursed (something frequent in the period, and even statutory in many firms whose activity depended on terminable concessions from the government, typically in railroads, electricity distribution and other utilities); this gave them no right to the "interest" part of the dividend on ordinary shares (usually 5 per cent of the nominal value), but a right to the "superdividend" above that "interest". Parts de fondateurs (founders' shares) were special shares, which were usually given to the firms' founders and gave them a right to a fixed portion of the total payments of "superdividend" to all other shareholders. Shares with multiple votes became frequent in the 1920s and were prohibited by law at the end of that decade 26 . Since the rights to dividends of these various shares differ, their prices don't move identically (the prices of founders' shares and enjoyment shares are more volatile). Usually, founders' shares are quite closely held and would not qualify for the previous criteria; enjoyment shares increase in numbers and can become dominant in the long run for some firms.
We measure the capitalization of each category and include in the index only the one with the highest capitalization (which proves to be almost always the ordinary shares). Another solution would be to add-up the various categories into a single one or to include all categories satisfying the previous criteria. We decided on our rule for three reasons. Firstly, it is used today by Euronext for the 25 The only well-known firm that is excluded during a period because of that requirement is Saint Gobain, which is number 34 by capitalization in 1858 (a rank that increases later) but with only 4,364 shares (each priced at 33,000 francs, or some 100,000 euros in today's money). One insurance company excluded up until the 1860s is Assurances Nationales Incendie (only 2,000 shares,). calculation of the CAC-40 27 . Secondly, the addition of all categories into a single capitalization would create biases, since the rights on the profits of the various shares were usually different, as were their risks, justifying differences in prices and in price variations among them. Lastly, our rule is likely to reflect the behaviour of investors, who probably, and with good reason, did not consider the holding of different securities in the same firm as useful diversification. In any case, this rule mostly affects a few railroads' actions de jouissance in the 19 th century, and the Suez Canal in the interwar period. The year most affected is 1936, in which the activity and share price of the Canal were recovering while the French market suffered overall decline. During that year, not only were the ordinary shares of the Canal the first (by far) capitalization of the Paris Bourse, but its other shares represented more than the second and the third capitalizations put together (Table 2) . Nevertheless, giving the Suez canal a weight in the index similar to that of all its shares in the capitalization would probably make the index too dependent on a single firm (at the peak, its ordinary shares represented 22.93 per cent of the CAC, and the total of its shares as much as 32.02 per cent). 28
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE
The prices used for the index are all transaction prices. On the Paris stock exchange, prices were set up until 1986 thanks to Walras-style auctioneers who gathered demands and offers for every stock and determined an equilibrium price (the fixing price) in a centralized manner at a fixed moment in the morning. Other prices could be quoted later in the day if transactions were sufficiently important. We chose to use the last price of the day for our index because some of the periodicals we used only mentioned that price.
The index is calculated using various periodicals, among which the most important is the official list price of the Paris Bourse, the Cote Officielle. We use a few other journals in order to complete for missing issues, incomplete data and for the shares that were not traded on the official market but on 27 The very existence of this rule probably modifies the behaviour of today's firms, making them eliminate special shares to improve the likelihood of access to the CAC-40 and the visibility that would give them.
This was not the case in the past, but we still prefer to maintain that rule for the sake of continuity. the unofficial Coulisse 29 or on provincial exchanges instead. The first step was to collect for the first Friday of every January the name, last price, nominal value, paid value, number of shares and dividends for every share mentioned in our sources (a number which varied from 100 to more than 600 during our period 30 ). This first collection allowed us to calculate the capitalization of all important listed shares, and then to select the 40 most important ones. The second step consisted in collecting monthly prices for these 40 stocks for the first Friday of each month 31 .
Within each year, our index is calculated using individual stock prices weighted by their capitalization, from January to January. Monthly returns are calculated as :
Where the numbers of shares are constant within each year.
Components are modified every January, using the new capitalization data and each year's index is chained to the next one using January's value as a basis. This index is based on the value of the official CAC-40 index when it was created on December 31 st , 1987, which was taken as 1000.
Some technical choices were made, which we believe have no lasting impact on the level of the index. These counts may not be exhaustive since some more shares could be traded on the Coulisse, provincial Bourses or OTC markets without being mentioned in journals, but they were marginal and could not modify our results, in particular the list of the forty major stocks. 31 Friday was chosen because it does not correspond to settlement periods (forward operations were settled every 15 days or every month depending on the moment during our period), and because weekly periodicals, usually published on Saturday, gave Friday prices. capitalization in the index, compared to 16.4 per cent for the smallest). The ten biggest capitalizations, which weigh 61 per cent of the index on average, have only 3.88 per cent missing prices. Although one may consider these proportions as high, they are standard in historical finance (e.g. Goetzman & al. 2000) , and they actually are a major reason for calculating blue chip indices rather than comprehensive ones. Most importantly, we don't think that our choice has any impact on our index's long term performance.
Second choice: although the precise date at which dividends are paid have a short term impact on equity prices payments, we don't adjust prices for that effect. First, because precise payments' dates are frequently not mentioned in our sources. Second, most importantly, because our aim is to measure long term changes in prices, which are certainly not affected. For the same reason, we make no adjustment for capital changes (except for stock splits, for which prices were adjusted) or for firms appearing or disappearing during the year (IPOs, mergers, nationalisations, bankruptcies). Firms appearing during the year and big enough to be admitted in the CAC-40 are included the next January.
Firms disappearing are maintained up to the next January with the last price being used all months to that date (these repeated prices are included in those mentioned above). All these assumptions artificially weakly decrease the within-year volatility, but don't affect year to year changes in the index (at least as suggested by a check on the 1987-1997 period discussed in more detail below). Furthermore, these choices affect a limited number of prices, making it unlikely that the index is significantly modified.
That methodology is the one followed in order to build the pure price index. From the same sources we compute the return from dividends at the beginning of each year, which is added to the price index in order to build an index for total return. Below, whenever an index is mentioned without mention of dividends or total return, we mean the pure price index.
II COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS INDICES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Comparison Figure 1 compares our index to the main existing indices which are usually linked to cover the whole period 32 , and which we jointly call the Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index, with a common basis in 1854=108. Table 3 provides evidence that these differences were statistically significant for the periods covered by the three different authors. The discrepancies are enormous, but also surprisingly easy to explain.
FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
The Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index links an index built by Arbulu for the 1802-1913 period to those built at the time by Statistique Générale de la France (SGF), the official statistical office, and later by its successor INSEE. This index -or part of it -has been used by all recent studies on the long run performance of the Paris stock exchange, mostly due to lack of alternatives and because of the inclusion of its most official parts in official publications 33 .
The index built by SGF in the interwar period -as well as those of many other statistical institutions at the time -did not aim to measure the performance of a portfolio of stocks but rather to observe or anticipate fluctuations in macroeconomic activity 34 . For that reason, it did not focus on long term level change. In order not to miss any impending crisis or recovery, industry indices included as many firms as possible, all of them on an equal basis since they all could equally signal down-or upturns. The aggregate index was weighted by industry capitalization but was based on these un-weighted industry Other choices also cause substantial biases in the existing index. Arbulu's calculations suffer substantial survivor bias, since he chooses the shares to be included partly on the basis of their stability, more precisely he eliminates all shares which didn't remain listed at least five years, which makes him omit the Union générale (6 th capitalization by size in 1882, 5.51 per cent of our CAC-40, failed in 1882) or the Panama canal (9 th capitalization in 1884, also soon failed), and the substantial downward impact of their failure on contemporary portfolios and attitudes towards stock investment 39 . (table 5) .
TABLE 5 AROUND HERE
In our own index, we treat nationalizations using the same rules as for other firms exiting the index.
When a firm is nationalized and stops being listed, we retain the last quoted prices for the rest of the year and don't try to introduce non-market prices (such as the compensations paid by the government).
The main banks are nationalized by the law of December 2, 1945, with application on January 1 st , 1946; as a result there are no missing prices. In the gas and electricity industries, only one firm still belonged to our index in January 1946, in spite of the fact that the nationalization project was only compensations); their stocks remained listed in 1945 but their prices decreased quickly, so that none belonged to the CAC-40 in January, 1945. Finally, no insurance firm was large enough to enter the CAC-40. Nationalized firms then disappeared progressively from the CAC-40 as they disappeared from the portfolios of investors, who turned to other stocks. Our methodology mimics that behaviour just by maintaining consistently its own rules. It is likely that it underestimates the negative impact of nationalizations on the portfolios of their holders since in some cases, the government blocked the shareholders' investments during a long (highly inflationary) period before they obtained compensation that could be sold and reinvested in other shares, when we assume this was done at the end of the year when the last price was quoted.
Unsurprisingly, that period is the one with most divergences between our CAC-40 and the official index.
We conclude that the methodology of the existing Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index makes it greatly inadequate in order to measure the actual performance that could be obtained by investors, and that using it in that purpose would lead to a severe overestimation of that performance 42 . We synthesize them in table 6.
TABLE 6 AROUND HERE

Robustness checks
Given the enormous difference between the traditional index and ours, one might reasonably ask for more robustness checks than just identifying the biases in the older index. A direct way to validate our own methodology is to compare it to the true CAC-40. We did so for the first decade of its existence . Both indices are highly correlated, as can be seen in Figure 2 .
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
Nevertheless, our own index performs slightly worse than Euronext's (7.5 percent less growth over 10 years, compared to a global rise of 185 per cent, or a 4 per cent difference). This difference is statistically not significant: tests do not reject the hypothesis of identical means, variances, skewness, 42 A comparison of the performances of our CAC-40 and the SGF-INSEE-Arbulu index shows that the latter significantly over-performed the former in all decades but one since 1854. kurtosis or distribution 43 . If it were, it would probably result from the choices in Euronext's selection method, that allowed smaller or more dynamic firms to be included, compared to our automatic selection method. In any case, that divergence is small compared to the one we observed between the Arbulu-SGF-INSEE index and our own.
We also use this period to distinguish the consequences of our selection method (strictly 40 first capitalizations) and our simplifying assumptions (rebalancing of the selection only once a year, no treatment within the year of mergers, nationalization or failure, little correction for some capital modifications). For that purpose, we calculate another index, CAC3, which is composed as the authentic one at the start of each year, but not recomposed during the year, and to which we apply our simplifying assumptions. Table 7 shows that -contrary to our index -this index performs better than the authentic CAC-40, suggesting that sample selection is the major cause of the negative difference between our index and the official one, and that our simplifying technical assumptions per se would more probably bias the index upward -if there is a bias. This would then mainly reinforce our conclusions.
The official CAC-40 also presents an assumption that we did not apply to our historical reconstruction: it imposes a 15 per cent maximum on the weight of any stock. Our historical data ( Figure 3) show that the share of the biggest firm (even when restricted to its most important share, as described above) varies heavily, and that this 15 per cent ceiling was bypassed in 21 years of our sample. But recalculating our index with a 15 per cent ceiling showed no significant impact. Since such an assumption has little theoretical support, we preferred to retain our unlimited index.
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
Another robustness check considers the impact of the number of stocks included in the index. As we explained above, we chose a blue chips index in order to correspond to the behaviour of most investors 43 Formal tests of the official CAC-40 and ours being identical between 1988 and 1997 gives the following results: for equal kurtosis 124.46 (< 144.35 as X 2 critical value at 5 per cent); for equal skewness 20.88 (< 144.35 as X 2 critical value at 5 per cent); for equal distributions 20.45 (<36.41 as X 2 critical value 5 per cent). and to maximize the data quality. We chose 40 stocks for continuity with today's CAC-40 and because we considered 40 as a sufficient number for diversification purposes. Somewhat higher numbers would also be consistent with this rationale, but not necessary; broadening the index to 50 stocks would not change much, in any case, because the marginal stocks have very small capitalizations compared to the first 40. Figure 4 shows that the weight of the last 10 stocks included in the CAC-40 is 8 per cent on average between 1854 and 2006, the weight of the 40 th one being 0.69 per cent on average. Adding a few more stocks would probably have little effect on the index. Admittedly, a constant number of stocks in the index implies a varying weight of the CAC-40 firms within total market capitalization of Paris-listed stocks, but as we mentioned earlier, this variation has no trend.
We consider this is not as important an issue as the standard diversification behaviour of investors.
FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE
A last robustness check is provided by the calculation of an equally-weighted index based on the same sample as ours. Unsurprisingly, the performance of the equally-weighted index, which over-weights the (relatively) small firms in the index, is better than that of our capitalization-weighted index (table   8) . This confirms the importance of a strict selection method and of the frequent adjustments in sample and weights. World War 1 appears as a rupture in volatility series ( Figure 5) . After a long period of decreasing volatility from 1854 to 1914, it increased sharply and remained high throughout the 20 th century. On average, standard deviation almost tripled from the 19 th century to the 20 th . A chi-squared test comparing the distribution of monthly variations for 1854-1913 and the same number of months after 1914 clearly rejects the hypothesis of identical distributions 44 . This much higher volatility could be interpreted as the sign of a high inflation risk, although its persistence in the most recent period suggests another explanation may be necessary.
Nominal performance
FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE
The volatility of dividends was much lower and stable, with a standard deviation below 2 per cent during all sub-periods. Actually, dividend smoothing was probably a standard practice in the short run, as can be seen in Figure 6 , where most of the short run changes in dividend yield can be accounted for by variations in stock prices rather than by autonomous changes in dividends. Overall, the decreasing importance of dividends is consistent with the change of dividend behaviour that has been documented in various countries for the period around the First World War. It can be interpreted as a tax optimization choice, since in many countries (including France) the taxation of dividends increased substantially during that period compared to that of capital gains. It can also result from changes in corporate governance and investment strategies, especially the emergence of modern corporations in which shareholders were marginalized by managers and profits were increasingly reinvested 45 .
Up to now, our results are more or less in line with the standard history of stock prices, in which the most significant changes are the acceleration of capital gains and the relative decrease of dividends in the 20 th century, in relation to the emergence of general inflation in that period. What is most specific to France is the real performance, once that inflation is taken into account.
Real performance: wars or policy regime changes?
The real long term performance of the CAC-40 index (without dividends) was significantly negative 
FIGURE 7 AND TABLE 10 AROUND HERE
To our knowledge, a negative return for such a long period is unique to the French market. One may wonder whether the problems lie in the consumer price indices we used. We don't think so, for a number of reasons. Firstly, French price indices were developed since the late 19 th century by high-quality and up-to-date statisticians involved in international methodological discussions, so there is no reason for French indices to be more upward-biased than those of other countries 46 . Secondly, contrary to stock market indices, they have been checked for consistency with other macroeconomic variables for decades 47 . Thirdly, biases could also be downward, since underestimates during periods of price controls (wars in particular, but for some products in France up to the 1980s) may not have been corrected in the later periods. Fourthly, the underestimation of quality changes, which is the mostargued reason for upward biases in consumer price indices, is likely to be more important in low inflation and service-dominated economies such as the French one in the recent period, precisely the only one during which the real performances of the stock market are high.
One may argue that a correct measure must include the reinvestment of dividends to appreciate the total return. On that account, the average total real return from 1854 to 2006 was only 3.05 per cent, These period to period changes are all statistically highly significant, and the radical departure from 19 th century metallic standards and price stability with the start of World War One makes it unnecessary to use technical tools to identify the watershed date. One must conclude that investment in French equities just protected wealth against inflation during that period, even when reinvesting all dividends, something which has been observed in other countries, but never for such a long period 49 Long-Term Growth (New York, 1994) . 49 The literature on the relationships between stock real returns and inflation is huge. It frequently finds some negative correlation for the short run, but not in the long run. See J. Boudoukh and M. Richardson.
The literature has already highlighted the negative impact of the wars on the returns on equity investments 50 , but has never found it as important and long-lasting as we do. In order to distinguish the immediate impact of the wars from more lasting impact on returns, sections F and H of table 10 measure the impact of both wars when including in the "war period" the years until GDP returned to its pre-war level (1922 after World War One, 1950 after World War Two). The total yearly returns of the CAC-40 during these two war periods are particularly bad, below -10 per cent in both cases in real terms, in particular because of high average inflation rates (during World War Two, dividends were legally capped, which may have contributed to low returns). A broader view, in line with the characterization (by no less than Winston Churchill) of the whole 1914-1945 period as the "Second Thirty Years War" 51 , suggests that we consider the entire 1914-1950 period as one of war and reconstruction, in which low returns were the price paid by wealth owners for the destruction and costs of the wars. That perspective fits well with our data, which show that the yearly real total return of the CAC-40 was hardly positive during the 1923-1939 period (a consequence of some remaining inflation in the mid-1920s, of the Great Depression, and of renewed inflation in the run-up to the war from 1936 onward).
We could then consider that the "normal period" only resumed in 1951. Does this period represent a comeback to the sort of performances the French financial market provided before World War One?
The answer to that question is not straightforward, as can be inferred from Then, we may consider that the major reason for the low performance of the CAC-40 index in the 20 th century is the succession of two World Wars in the first half of the century. If we exclude these periods (as in section B of Table 10 ) the CAC-40 performs reasonably well over the very long run, although not as well as the US stock market. This is also true if we consider only the second half of the 20 th century. Nevertheless, it remains intriguing that this period includes two such different subperiods. This suggests that not only the World Wars, but maybe also policy regime changes may have a role in explaining the long term performances of the Paris stock market.
In summary, when the 19 th century appears as a normal and comprehensible period from the point of view of contemporary stock markets, the 20 th century proves more difficult to assess. Two different accounts of the 20 th century are possible. The first considers the long war period as the only reason for low stock returns, and insists on the normal level of equity returns over the very long term after 1950.
The other, consistent with the "short 20 th century" view, considers that the period of exceptionally low real returns stopped only in 1983, a moment at which those who owned (or bought) stocks benefited from an exceptional increase in prices and returns, lasting up until recently. That view also claims that the recent period (since 1983) does not appear as a return to the 19 th century: not only are overall real returns higher (which may result mostly from a shorter period, which incorporates little bear market yet), but volatility remains very high (actually slightly higher than in the "20 th century") and dividends remain low.
Comparison with other investments
A well-known result of US long term investment is the equity premium puzzle: in the long run, equities perform not only better than other investments, but the return they provide is higher than what their higher volatility requires as a compensation for risk. Although no explanation for this fact has found widespread acceptance, it has provoked much discussion; its validity outside the U.S. still requires detailed scrutiny using high quality data. In the French case, an equity premium also exists for the whole of our long period, but it remains low. Stocks are the best investment despite long periods of negative real returns since bonds and the money market perform even worse. As shown in Table 11 , the equity premium compared to bonds was 1.75 per cent on average from 1854 to 2006, and was below 2.5 per cent during all sub-periods except World War Two and the most recent period.
TABLE 11 AROUNDHERE
This level of equity premium seems more consistent with standard financial theory than the levels found in the US. Figure 9 draws a risk line for the French financial market for various sub-periods and table 10 gives detailed data for all periods. Although the evidence is indicative rather than conclusive, given the limited number of separate points included, Figure 9 suggests that returns were to some extent related to risks, with no excessive risk premium for equities.
FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE
Two points are striking. One is that the risk line moved a lot during the 1914-1982 period, compared to its position for the previous and subsequent periods. The second is the high risk and high return for investments in gold precisely from 1914 to 1982. In a period of unstable monetary regime, during which France was on the verge of hyperinflation at least once (at the end of World War Two), gold became a valeur refuge that was highly priced by French investors 52 . Holding gold allowed one to escape both taxation and monetary confiscation, and provided sufficient liquidity despite the legal risks. In particular, gold was internationally valued and then provided for international diversification when it was forbidden by exchange controls. This was not an absurd behaviour, as has frequently been argued, since gold obtained the highest average return on that period despite paying no income. From the position of gold on the risk line, we can argue that an optimal French portfolio in keeping with the Markowitz definition should have included a significant proportion of gold from 1914 to 1982. This suggests French investors were rational in investing so much in gold, even if it may have been costly in terms of lost economic growth. On the other hand, gold was an underperforming asset during periods of stable prices, even if recent events suggest it can still protect against some risks.
In summary, when stocks dominate gold (in stable periods) they also dominate bonds, while when gold beats stock (in inflationary periods) it also beats bonds. Then, the issue for French investors was not one of choosing over financial instruments but whether to invest in the (French) financial market or not.
Investments in real estate may have been even better than gold. Existing data suggest not only that the return on a flat bought and rented out in Paris was approximately as high as the return on gold, but also that the risk was much lower 53 . This may explain why real estate investment was so much favoured by the French as a protection against inflation. Nevertheless, these high performances may also result from a simple liquidity premium and a survivor bias, since the success of Paris as a major international city cannot be compared to that of many other French towns, not to mention rural areas whose population fell during the period. It may well be that although the owners of Parisian flats did well by renting and reselling them (with a negative period of rent constraint mostly limited to 1914-50), the result cannot be extended to other real-estate investments.
Our data also look consistent with the performances of other markets: the risk line for 1854-1913 drawn on Figure 10 suggests that returns in France were consistent with those for various financial assets on other markets. Jorion and Goetzmann suggested that the equity premium in the U.S. may be the result of a survivor bias at the level of the American market as a whole, compared to the global stock market, and that the U.S. actually diverged from most European countries after 1914, since they were much less affected by the two World Wars 54 . Our data suggest that the U.S. market performance was already very high before 1914, but also that this was the normal price to be paid to those willing http://www.adef.org/statistiques/engstathome.htm, builds an index for Parisian real estate using a repeated sales methodology; F. Simonnet, G. Gallais-Hamonno, and P. Arbulu "Un siècle de placement immobilier, l'exemple de La Fourmi Immobilière", Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris, 2ème trimestre 139, n o 2, (1998), pp. 95-135, collect stock prices of La Fourmi Immobilière, a firm who managed the same Parisian buildings on a pure-equity basis from 1905 to 1995. 54 to participate in such a risky market compared to the French one 55 , making its holding consistent with an optimal international allocation of capital 56 .
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A long marginalized financial market
The poor performance of the French stock index for the "short 20 th century" might result from inefficient pricing or from exogenous shocks on the French economy. We will argue in another article that the functioning of the French market was not qualitatively different from that of other markets.
We will show below that the behaviour of the index cannot be separated from the long decline in financial markets in 20 th century France, itself a by-product of its economic and political history.
We consider that the singular trajectory of the CAC-40 must be related to the structural changes in the French financial market during the 20 th century. The first one is the impact of the wars. This is visible in the evolution of dividend payments (Figure 11) , which fell after the First and even more after the Second World War (beyond the cap imposed during the war). It resulted partly from the negative impact of the wars on profits, and partly from inflation, which made nominal profits and dividends appear higher than their true level, and exposed them to high taxes. In the case of public utilities subject to government price regulation, inflation frequently led to price caps and to a reduction in profits 57 . As we already mentioned, the decrease in dividend yields may have resulted from an adaptation of firms to the rise in corporate and personal income taxes, a rise which was very sharp during and after World War One and was followed by a gradual decrease that only really started in 55 The US index used here is broader than ours, which may partly explain a higher return and volatility, but the difference is too big to be explained entirely by that fact. , 1914 -1926 ", Working paper, Delta, 2001 . 1960 . The 1914 level of overall dividend payments by the CAC-40 firms was not surpassed until 1968.
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The main explanation for this is not an overall stagnation of the economy or even of profits. It is the government interference in many firms, and especially the nationalization of many of the biggest corporations. The nationalized firms were certainly not always as profitable as they had been previously, as in the case of the railways, whose profits had been stagnating for years (partly because of regulation). Nevertheless, the nationalization of the arms industry and the railways (1937), and after World War Two that of the electricity, coal, gas, insurance and banking industries (including Bank of France), deprived the stock markets of many of their biggest listed securities. The last (short-lived) case was the 1982 nationalization of major industrial firms (Thomson, Saint-Gobain, Rhône-Poulenc, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman, Usinor) and the remaining big banks (Indosuez, Paribas, CIC, Crédit du Nord, CCF, Rothschild). This explains the evolution of the ratio of CAC-40 firms (and of total capitalization) to GDP (Figure 12 ).
FIGURE 12 AROUND HERE
In 1983, the ratio of CAC-40 capitalization to GDP was minimal 59 . It rose sharply in the next two decades thanks to two radical moves: the privatization of almost all the government-owned manufacturing, financial and utilities firms, and the rise in the stock index. This rise was also largely the result of the regime change of 1983, by which the French government allowed the financial market to play a major role in the economy again. A substantial rise in profits, which was a condition for French firms to attract investors, followed, and French stock prices became well integrated with international markets (especially after the suppression of the last exchange controls in 1986). From 1983 onwards, then, the stock index again provides a measure that is relevant for the study of the French economy. This is confirmed by a simple measure: the most important sudden (month to month) 58 On the creation of profit taxation in France and the problems in measuring its impact in an inflationary period, see Hautcoeur & Grottard, "Taxation of Corporate Profit"; on the taxation level in France in the 20 th century, see Th. Piketty, Les hauts revenus en France au XX e siècle (Paris, 2001) . 59 Minima were reached in 1951 (1.82 per cent) and 1983 (2.18 per cent). The 1882 maximum of 36 per cent for the CAC-40 was reached again in 1998. variations in the CAC-40 during our period (those above 3 standard deviations from the mean) correspond almost exclusively to political events during the "short 20 th century", but almost never during the periods before 1914 or after 1983. From that last date, international financial crises replaced political news as the most influential factor on the stock market. Our data then confirms the intuition by Goetzmann that international and national politics can have a long-lasting impact on stock market performances 60 .
IV CONCLUDING REMARKS
We propose a new index of French stock prices. Compared to previous indices, ours is much more consistent with modern stock index methodologies that aim to measure portfolio performances for the investor. Because they had different objectives, previous indices dramatically overestimated the return in stock prices. Adequately measured stock returns, as in our CAC-40, present a radical regime change in 1914: because of a combination of the war's impact on profits and assets, of war inflation and of the rise of taxation (the impact of which was multiplied by inflation, since it was applied to nominal incomes), stock prices decreased sharply in real terms. The same phenomenon occurred during the Second World War. In between, the stock market caught up a little, just to be hit by the Great Depression. Soon, nationalization affected a large proportion of listed firms, so that the size of the stock market decreased sharply. Up until the next regime change, the stock index performed badly. At the same time, by and large, the economic function of the stock market was restricted to a small proportion of the French economy, in which most major corporations were State-owned. This was reversed in the 1980s, which explains the recent rise in the size of the stock market.
We consider this interpretation more consistent than the one according to which stock prices have risen in France almost as if no significant event had affected the country in the 20 th century. More importantly, we wonder whether the same story -or a variation on it -may apply to many other European countries since the same destructive wars provided similar experiences of financial repression, taxation and inflation throughout Europe. Actually, the same methodological problems we 60 have mentioned affected at least some foreign indices during some periods. For example, during the interwar period, most of them included only manufacturing firms, excluding financial services and utilities which weigh heavily in actual portfolios. In many cases, indices were also built without weighting by market capitalization (either without weighting or weighting by nominal capital, book value or transaction volumes). At least in some cases, these indices are still in use today when one looks at these periods (Table 12 ). As we have seen in the French case, this may mean that the performances of investment in some stock markets have been grossly overestimated.
TABLE 12 AROUND HERE
More broadly, optimistic assessments of the long term performances of stock investment must be tempered: equities clearly provided a better return than other financial assets on the very long run in France as elsewhere. However, the frequent extrapolation from Siegel's results on the U.S. market to the existence of a "Siegel's constant" of 6 to 7 per cent yearly total real return for such investments must be mitigated 61 . Equities provided no mysterious premium in France. The total real return on the CAC-40 varied from -18 per cent to 13 per cent, depending on the period, with an average of only affected the return on equities. If equities protected investors reasonably well against inflation outside the war periods, they protected them only modestly against political risks; this was true not only in the short but also in the long term. In the very long run, equities may still have been the best investment, but this was not the case for all generations of investors. If the 1914 to 1982 period was a parenthesis, it was a long one, and one that provides us with non-negligible experience; an experience which may also explain common elements in the attitude towards financial markets among the European countries that experienced it.
Appendix 1: Sources for the index 61 For example, see A. Smither and S. Wright. Valuing Wall Street, Protecting Wealth in Turbulent Markets (New-York, 2000) . -1918 1919-1946 1947-1990 Descriptive statistics of Arbulu-SGF-INSEE and CAC 40 1854-2006 1854-1913 1914-2006 1951-1982 1983-2006 (allows to join the official CAC-40 at 1,000 in 1988) . and our index methodology, 1988-97 
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